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4.1 Introduction
It has long been a concern of policymakers that foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) may cause job losses at home; indeed, labor unions generally
consider FDI to be the equivalent of job exporting. The logic is simple; as
production lines are relocated overseas, gone with them are the workers
that served the domestic lines. This reasoning is, of course, oversimplistic
because there could never be any guarantees that the production lines that
were relocated overseas would have been able to survive the competition
had they remained at home. If these production lines were to be eliminated
anyway, then their relocation does not result in any job losses.
Conversely, there is always the possibility that overseas investment might
well enhance the overall competitiveness of the investing company and
therefore boost job opportunities at home that would otherwise have been
swept away by competition. Ku (1998), for example, found that FDI en-
abled Taiwanese enterprises to restructure themselves and therefore in-
crease their tenacity. She showed that ﬁrms engaging in overseas produc-
tion had a better chance of survival than those that were not.
Those who are concerned about the adverse eﬀects of overseas invest-
ment on domestic employment basically assume that overseas production
is a substitute for exports; hence, as exports fall, so does employment. This
is a conventional argument along the lines of Mundell (1957), who showed
very elegantly, in a 2   2 model, that capital movement is equivalent to
trade. Products produced in overseas locations not only replace exports,
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search fellow at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.they may also in fact be reimported back home to substitute the products
that were previously produced to serve the home market (Liu and Lin
2001). There are, however, counterarguments to Mundell’s perfect substi-
tution theory. Markusen (1983), for example, demonstrated the theoretical
possibility that FDI and trade are complementary rather than substitutes;
therefore, the relationship between FDI and job opportunities at home is
indeed an empirical question.
Brainard and Riker (1997a,b) directly estimated the substitution elastic-
ities between employment in parent companies and their foreign aﬃliates,
as well as those between diﬀerent aﬃliates, and found a very low degree of
substitution between parent and aﬃliate employment, although there was
a high degree of substitution between aﬃliates in developing countries.
They also found that the relationship between employment in industrial-
ized country aﬃliates and in developing countries was complementary
rather than substituting.
Slaughter (1995) had earlier found a similar low degree of substitution
between parent and aﬃliate employment when only production workers
were considered. He noted that the employment of production workers did
not seem to be systematically related to relative wages between the parent
and the aﬃliate. This suggests that overseas employment corresponds only
weakly to the wage gap between home and host countries, although it may
correspond strongly to the wage gap between diﬀerent overseas locations.
Hatzius (1997) and Döhrn (1997) found similar results for Sweden with
overseas employment of Swedish multinational ﬁrms responding to wages
in actual and potential host countries but not to wages in Sweden. Blom-
ström and Kokko (2000) also discovered that Swedish multinationals react
to domestic policies rather than wages in determining whether to keep pro-
duction at home.
This evidence suggests that overseas production and domestic produc-
tion is closely related but not necessarily substitutable. In fact, there must
be a division of labor between the parent and aﬃliates as FDI is an action
taken to enhance the competitiveness of a company. To the extent that FDI
reduces the costs of the parent’s operations, it also helps the parent to ex-
pand its level of output, which, in turn, increases employment at home.
Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997), for example, found that overseas in-
vestment in developing countries by U.S. ﬁrms did have the eﬀect of replac-
ing domestic employment, but the same investment in developed coun-
tries did not; the replacement eﬀect was, however, limited to production
workers.
Findings that the employment eﬀect from FDI may diﬀer across labor
groups are important, for this implies that FDI has important conse-
quences for income distribution. For example, the examination of Swedish
ﬁrms by Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997) found that FDI contributes
to growth in employment of unskilled labor at home because Swedish
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in R&D and other skill-intensive activities. Lipsey’s (1994) study of U.S.
multinationals also found that overseas aﬃliates allow the parent to em-
ploy more managerial and technical staﬀ at the same level of domestic
production. Feenstra (1996) showed that FDI in Mexico by U.S. ﬁrms
increased the demand at home for skilled workers vis-à-vis unskilled
workers, thus raising the relative wage of skilled workers and worsening in-
come distribution for the investing country, whereas the reverse occurred
in Mexico.
There is an indirect, but nevertheless very important, linkage between
FDI and domestic employment, that is, the eﬀect of FDI on domestic in-
vestment. If FDI outﬂows are accompanied by an equal reduction in the
amount of domestic investment, then FDI may still reduce job opportuni-
ties at home even if overseas production is complementary to domestic
production; Feldstein (1994) seems to suggest such a one-to-one substitu-
tion eﬀect. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) also found a negative relationship be-
tween FDI and domestic investment, although not as clear as one-to-one
replacement, however, Bayoumi and Lipworth’s (1998) study of the case in
Japan found no displacement eﬀect on domestic investment from FDI.
Again, the actual relationship is therefore an empirical question.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine the relationship be-
tween FDI and domestic employment at ﬁrm level, using Taiwan’s manu-
facturing industry as an example. We ﬁnd that overseas production leads
to an increase in the domestic employment of managerial and technical
workers but may also reduce the employment available to unskilled work-
ers. Overseas production partially replaces inputs to domestic production,
resulting in a decline in labor demand at a given output level; however, at
the same time, overseas production reduces the costs of domestic produc-
tion, leading to an expansion in output. These input-replacement and out-
put-expansion eﬀects combine to produce a net eﬀect that is positive in
most cases, although the net eﬀect diﬀers with diﬀerent labor groups and
the geographical location of overseas investment.
4.2 An Overview of Taiwan’s FDI and Manufacturing Employment
Taiwanese ﬁrms made only sporadic outward investment before 1980.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Taiwanese ﬁrms started making more sub-
stantial foreign investment, driven by rising wages and rising value of
Taiwanese currency, NT. Between 1987 and 1990, Southeast Asia and the
United States were the major destinations of Taiwan’s foreign investment.
In the early 1990s, China emerged in the FDI map and eventually became
the most popular destination for Taiwanese investors. In the second half of
the 1990s, China took up almost a half of Taiwan’s total amount of out-
ward investment (see table 4.1). The manufacturing sector accounted for
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ture sectors. In the manufacturing sector, FDI is most active in the elec-
tronics, chemical, and textile industries. FDI appears to have important
consequences on domestic employment.
Manufacturing employment in Taiwan reached a peak in 1987 when
2.821 million people were working in the manufacturing sector; thereafter,
there was a general decline in manufacturing employment until it hit a
trough in 1994, when 2.422 million people were working in the sector. It
then started to recover through the mid- to late-1990s, with 2.655 million
people being employed in the manufacturing sector by 2000 (see ﬁgure
4.1).
The available employment data suggests that the period 1987–1994 was
a time when Taiwan’s industry underwent dramatic restructuring. While
there were losses of 399,000 manufacturing jobs throughout that period,
there was nevertheless an increase in employment in the service sector of
around 1.385 million, more than enough to oﬀset these losses. Thus, un-
employment rates remained at low levels throughout the 1990s.
It is also worth noting that 1987 was around the time when Taiwanese
ﬁrms began to embark on the course of FDI, with more than US$43 bil-
lion being invested overseas from 1987 to 2000. Between 1987 and 1992,
FDI was concentrated in Southeast Asia where Malaysia, Thailand, and
Indonesia took the lion’s share of Taiwan’s overseas investment; however,
from 1992 onward, the focus for FDI shifted to China. After the 1997
Asian ﬁnancial crisis, FDI in Southeast Asia came to a virtual standstill
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Table 4.1 Taiwan’s outward investment by location (US$1,000)
Asia 
(excluding China) America Europe China Others Total
1952–1990 1,077,710 1,844,332 115,171 0 39,298 3,076,511
1991 929,819 658,958 60,289 174,158 6,964 1,830,188
1992 369,929 449,096 45,933 246,992 22,301 1,134,251
1993 663,514 740,110 255,913 3,168,411 1,398 4,829,346
1994 559,471 988,336 22,209 962,209 46,748 2,578,973
1995 467,743 787,105 59,868 1,092,713 42,162 2,449,591
1996 661,717 1,442,953 11,875 1,229,241 48,859 3,394,645
1997 818,743 1,915,948 58,508 4,334,313 100,627 7,228,139
1998 580,819 2,637,021 33,828 2,034,621 44,634 5,330,923
1999 836,378 2,267,710 60,982 1,252,780 103,943 4,521,793
2000 851,065 3,946,021 62,225 2,607,142 217,751 7,684,204
2001 814,981 3,460,902 45,594 2,784,147 70,177 7,175,801
2002 528,054 2,475,575 123,416 6,723,058 243,001 10,093,104
Total 9,159,943 23,614,067 955,811 26,609,785 987,863 61,327,469
Source: Statistics on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Outward Investment, and Indirect Mainland
Investment (various issues), Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs.whereas FDI in China continued to surge. In 2001, the global recession saw
Taiwan’s unemployment rate reaching an unprecedented 4 percent; thus,
there were heightened fears that FDI may have led to rising unemployment
at home.
Beneath the surface of a relatively stable employment situation in the
1990s, there was a rather dramatic transformation taking place in the in-
dustrial structure. Among twenty-two two-digit industries in the manufac-
turing sector, twelve had increased their employment levels whereas the
remaining ten had seen their employment levels falling. The most rapid
increase in employment occurred in the electronics industry in which
145,748 new jobs had been generated between 1991 and 2000, representing
a 24.3 percent increase on the 1990 level. It was probably no coincidence
that the electronics industry was also the industry that was most active in
undertaking outward investment. In contrast, employment in the apparel
industry recorded the largest number of job losses, at 54,104, representing
a loss of more than one-third of its initial 1991 employment level. However,
FDI from the apparel industry was also substantial; thus, the relationship
between FDI and domestic employment is unclear, to say the least. In the
following section, we will examine this relationship in more detail.
4.3 The Statistics on FDI and Employment
In this section, we present the employment data revealed by Taiwan’s
Census of Manufacturers and relate this to FDI. The census data are col-
lected at plant level but are then aggregated into ﬁrm-level data; all of the
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Fig. 4.1 Manufacturing employment, 1981–2000following statistics are reported at ﬁrm level because it is considered that
FDI is decided at ﬁrm level rather than at plant level. Changes in employ-
ment between 1993 and 2000 are studied, with 1993 having been chosen as
the starting year because this was the ﬁrst time that a comprehensive set of
FDI statistics was collected in the census; 2000 is chosen as the terminal
year because this was the most recent census year. A total of 75,101 ﬁrms
are included in the 1993 census, of which 49,260 had survived until 2000,
while the remaining 25,841 had exited the market during the period under
study. Between 1993 and 2000, 27,585 new ﬁrms had entered the market,
with these new entries during this eight-year period representing 36.7 per-
cent of the stock of ﬁrms in the initial year, and the exiting ﬁrms repre-
senting 34.4 percent of the stock, a characteristically high turnover rate for
Taiwan’s industry (Aw, Chen, and Roberts 2001). All ﬁrms that have shown
up in either the 1993 census or the 2000 census come to a total of 102,686,
which forms our sample for comparison.
We classify all sample ﬁrms into two categories, the FDI group and the
non-FDI group. The FDI group includes all ﬁrms that have undertaken
overseas investment, and the non-FDI group includes those that have not
undertaken any such investment. Although there are some missing data,
the census does cover the majority of manufacturing ﬁrms. The total em-
ployment ﬁgures in the sample were 2,155,672 persons for 1993, and
2,291,396 for 2000, representing 89.8 percent and 92.9 percent, respec-
tively, of the total employment estimated by the statistics authorities dur-
ing the two census years.
We tabulate the turnover of sample ﬁrms in table 4.2, which shows that
there were 4,283 ﬁrms in the FDI group and 98,403 ﬁrms in the non-FDI
group. Although, in terms of the number of ﬁrms, the FDI group ac-
counted for just 4.3 percent of the manufacturing sector (ignoring the
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Table 4.2 FDI and domestic employment, 1993–2000 (persons, %)
1993 2000
Firm group No. of ﬁrms Employment % Employment %
FDI ﬁrms 4,283 608,501 28.23 689,769 30.10
Survivors 2,843 558,243 25.90 625,013 27.28
Exited 900 50,258 2.33 n.a. n.a.
New entrants 540 n.a. n.a. 64,756 2.83
Non-FDI ﬁrms 98,403 1,547,171 71.77 1,601,627 69.90
Survivors 46,417 1,119,060 51.91 1,055,421 46.06
Exited 24,941 428,111 19.86 n.a. n.a.
New entrants 27,045 n.a. n.a. 546,206 23.84
Total 102,686 2,155,672 100.00 2,291,396 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculation from Census of Manufacturers, 1993 and 2000.
Note: n.a.   not available.missing data), it nevertheless accounted for 28.23 percent of total employ-
ment within the sector, which suggests that ﬁrms engaging in overseas in-
vestment are relatively large in size.
Out of the 4,283 ﬁrms in the FDI group, 3,743 ﬁrms were already in ex-
istence in 1993; the remainder was made up of new ﬁrms that entered dur-
ing the period under study. From the initial 1993 cohort, 2,843 had sur-
vived the competition and remained active within the industry in 2000,
representing a 76.0 percent survival rate.
Meanwhile, out of the 98,403 ﬁrms in the non-FDI group, 71,358 ﬁrms
were already in existence in 1993, and 46,417 ﬁrms had survived up until
2000, representing a 65.0 percent survival rate. Simple statistics suggest
that those ﬁrms that were engaged in overseas investment had a higher sur-
vival rate, supporting the ﬁndings of Ku (1998), which, in a study of Tai-
wan’s electronics industry, showed that FDI did indeed increase the prob-
ability of survival.
Within our sample, the FDI group accounted for 28.23 percent of all
manufacturing sector employment in 1993, but by 2000, this ﬁgure had
risen to 30.10 percent. If we count only those ﬁrms that were in existence
in 1993, the employment share in 2000 was 27.28 percent, representing
only a slight fall on the 1993 proportion despite the fact that a quarter of
them had been eliminated in the interim period. In contrast, the non-FDI
group accounted for 71.77 percent of all manufacturing sector employ-
ment in 1993 and 69.90 percent in 2000. However, if new entrants are ex-
cluded, the surviving ﬁrms in the non-FDI group account for only 46.06
percent of employment in 2000. Simple statistics again suggest that FDI
enabled investing ﬁrms to maintain more jobs at home.
It is worth noting that ﬁrms that exited the manufacturing industry
during the period under study eliminated 478,369 jobs, or 22.2 percent of
the total employment in 1993. These losses were more than oﬀset by the
610,962 jobs created by new entrants coming into the industry during the
eight-year period. Total employment provided by those ﬁrms that survived
the period is virtually unchanged; however, employment per ﬁrm increased
by 12.0 percent in the FDI group in contrast to the 5.7 percent decline in
the non-FDI group.
4.4 The Eﬀect of Investment Location
As demonstrated by Lipsey (1994) and Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey
(1997), the employment eﬀect of FDI may diﬀer by investment location;
thus, we should also examine the data on Taiwan to see whether geograph-
ical location matters. Taiwanese FDI had been concentrated in China since
the early 1990s; however, there is one perspective that argues that invest-
ment in China is potentially more harmful to domestic employment than
FDI in other regions. The reason for this, so the argument goes, is because
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China being likely to duplicate what had previously been done in Taiwan
and therefore exerting a strong substitution eﬀect on domestic employ-
ment.
In order to examine the location eﬀect, we classify those ﬁrms under-
taking overseas investment into four subgroups according to the location
of their investment. The ﬁrst subgroup contains ﬁrms undertaking invest-
ment in China only, the second subgroup contains ﬁrms investing in China
plus other regions, the third subgroup contains ﬁrms investing in regions
other than China, and the fourth subgroup contains ﬁrms with unknown
FDI locations. Table 4.3provides details of the level of employment for the
four respective subgroups in 1993 and 2000.
As the table shows, of the 2,843 ﬁrms that undertook overseas invest-
ment and survived the 1993–2000 period, 1,048 had invested only in China,
630 had invested in China and somewhere else, 692 had invested only out-
side of China, and the remainder had invested in unknown regions. Those
investing only in China were apparently smaller in size as their average em-
ployment was only 116.58 in 1993, substantially lower than the average 
employment level for the entire FDI group; furthermore, the average em-
ployment of this subgroup declined again, to 107.55 employees, in 2000. In
contrast, the subgroup investing only outside of China registered the high-
est growth rate in employment of all the subgroups, at 33.49 percent, while
ﬁrms that invested in China and other regions saw their employment rise
by 16.99 percent.
This seems to suggest that investing only in China undermines the in-
vestor’s capacity to maintain jobs at home; however, this conclusion is
somewhat premature as there are other factors that may aﬀect domestic
employment after an enterprise invests abroad. Two obvious factors are
ﬁrm size and industry. It is well established within the literature that ﬁrm
size is positively correlated to the ability to invest abroad (Caves 1971,
1996). Large ﬁrms may therefore be more capable of undergoing internal
restructuring after they have invested abroad and therefore are more ca-
pable of maintaining jobs at home (Chen and Ku 2000).
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Table 4.3 Employment eﬀect, by FDI location
Investment No.  of  Average  Average  1993–2000 
location ﬁrms 1993 employment 2000 employment change (%)
China 1,048 122,179 116.58 112,710 107.55 –7.75
China and others 630 284,876 452.18 333,269 529.00 16.99
Other than China 692 101,698 146.96 135,752 196.17 33.49
Unknown 473 49,490 104.63 43,282 91.51 –12.54
Total 2,843 558,243 196.36 625,013 219.84 11.96
Source: Authors’ calculation from Census of Manufacturers, 1993 and 2000.Industry is also an important factor because a high-growth industry pro-
vides more opportunities for ﬁrms to diversify after they have invested
abroad. In order to test the size and industry eﬀects, we make a two-way
classiﬁcation of ﬁrms according to their size and industry aﬃliations; ﬁrms
that employ more than 300 persons are classiﬁed as large ﬁrms; the rest are
small ﬁrms. Industries that have grown by more than 30 percent in output
between 1993 and 2000 are considered to be high-growth industries; oth-
erwise they are low-growth industries; the demarcation line of 30 percent
is the average growth rate in entire manufacturing output for the period un-
der study.
We apply analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine how much FDI
location matters when controlling for industry and size and vice versa; the
results are shown in table 4.4, which indicates that when controlling for in-
vestment location, employment growth is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by both in-
dustry and size. Firms in the high-growth industries show a signiﬁcantly
higher employment growth rate than those in the low-growth industries,
while large ﬁrms show a signiﬁcantly higher employment growth rate than
small ﬁrms.
When both industry and ﬁrm size are controlled for, investment location
becomes inconsequential, except for the small-ﬁrm group where those in-
vesting in China only registered the lowest employment growth rate, as
compared to those investing outside of China. This seems to suggest that
job displacement, if there is any, may aﬀect small ﬁrms that choose to in-
vest solely in China.
4.5 Estimating the Eﬀects of FDI on Employment
In this section, we estimate the statistical eﬀects of FDI on employment,
using a production function to portray the relationship between domestic
and overseas operations. We basically treat overseas operation and do-
mestic operation as joint production that can be portrayed by an appro-
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Table 4.4 Change in employment, 1993–2000 (ANOVA)
Industry Size
Investment location Low growth High growth F-statistics Small Large F-statistics Sample
China 0.017 0.812 3.27∗ 0.044 4.238 27.43∗∗ 1,048
China and others 0.235 1.524 8.52∗∗ 0.628 1.669 27.15∗∗ 692
Other than China 0.183 0.532 4.59∗∗ 0.241 1.239 2.92∗ 630
Unknown 0.226 0.716 0.458 0.525 473
F-statistics 1.36 1.01 2.61∗∗ 1.19 2,843
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.priate production function. The output from overseas production may
serve as an intermediate input to domestic production, thereby reducing
the cost of domestic production; by so doing, this reduces the demand for
domestic primary inputs, including labor. The output from overseas pro-
duction may also add to the burden of domestic operations if it requires
managerial and technical support from the headquarters. Here, we treat
the output from both overseas and domestic operations as two joint
outputs from centrally managed production aimed at minimizing overall
costs.
We employ the generalized Leontief production function developed by
Diewert (1971) and Hall (1973) to portray a cross-border operation yield-
ing two distinctive outputs Y1 and Y2, where Y1 is the output from domes-
tic operations and Y2 is that from foreign operations. There are three kinds
of labor inputs to production, namely managerial workers, technical work-
ers, and blue-collar workers. Labor is ﬁnely classiﬁed because we are con-
cerned about the eﬀects of FDI on diﬀerent kinds of labor, given the
complexity of the international division of labor. Three kinds of workers
constitute a composite labor input underlying which is a subproduction
function. The relationship between this composite labor input and capital
is a Leontief relationship; therefore, the demand for labor can be solely de-
termined by output levels and wages, irrespective of capital input. We can
therefore depict the cost function of the composite labor as follows:
C (Y1, Y2, W 1, W 2, W 3)    1Y1W1    2Y1W 2    3Y1W 3    4Y2W 1    5Y2W 2
   6Y2W 3   2 7W 1 Y1Y2     2 8W 2 Y1Y2  
  2 9W 3 Y1Y2     2 10Y1 W 1W 2     2 11Y1 W 1W 3  
  2 12Y1 W 2W 3     2 13Y2 W 1W 2  
  2 14Y2 W 2W 3     2 15Y2 W 1W 3  
  4 16 Y1Y2W  1W 2     4 17 Y1Y2W  2W3  
  4 18 Y1Y2W  1W 3  ,
where C is the total cost of labor and W 1, W 2, and W 3 are the respective unit
costs of managerial workers, technical workers, and blue-collar workers.
Note that outputs Y1, Y2 are measured by value added in NT dollar terms.
The sample covers ﬁrms from various industries, and value added is the
only meaningful measuring unit common to all industries.
Although the generalized Leontief production function restricts the pro-
duction technology to be constant returns to scale, it does allow the elas-
ticity of substitution (or complementarity) between three kinds of labor to
be ﬂexible. The interrelationship between diﬀerent kinds of labor in pro-
duction is the focus of our study.
Using Shephard’s lemma, we may derive the labor demand equation for
each kind of worker:
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where L1, L2, and L3 denote managerial, technical, and blue-collar work-
ers, respectively.
We may use seemingly unrelated regressions to estimate equation (1),
taking into consideration the fact that disturbance terms in the three single
equations may be somehow correlated. In undertaking the regression, we
should impose cross-equation restrictions on parameters to ensure that the
same estimate is produced for any parameter that appears in more than one
equation. From the parameter estimates, we can easily measure the eﬀects
of Y1 and Y2 on each kind of labor demand, as shown in equation (1).
In order to measure the quantity of labor, data was drawn from the lat-
est survey on employment undertaken by Taiwan’s Bureau of Labor Af-
fairs (BOLA) in 1999. The survey classiﬁes labor into nine categories, but
these nine categories are far too many to handle and also contain many
zeros; therefore, they are combined into three categories to suit our pur-
poses: (a) supervisory (managers), administrative, and professional staﬀ
are classiﬁed as managerial workers; (b) engineers, technicians, and spe-
cialists are classiﬁed as technical workers; and (c) operators, laborers, and
service workers are classiﬁed as blue-collar workers. The raw data drawn
The Eﬀects of Overseas Investment on Domestic Employment 119from the three small labor categories are converted into a large category,
using the Divisia index, with each sample mean being normalized to unity.
We thus obtained the measures for L1 (managerial workers), L2 (technical
workers), and L3 (blue-collar workers).
Wage rates W 1, W 2, W 3 are obtained by dividing the respective total wage
bills by the measures of L1, L2, and L3. The data for domestic output (Y1) and
overseas output (Y2) are obtained from the 1999 Survey on Overseas Invest-
ment by Manufacturing Firms undertaken by the Ministry of Economic
Aﬀairs (MOEA). This survey also provides information on investment loca-
tions, but it only covers manufacturing ﬁrms that possess overseas aﬃliates.
The BOLA and MOEA surveys are combined to yield 394 observations, all
of which are ﬁrms engaged in FDI. We then randomly drew 140 non-FDI
ﬁrms from the BOLA survey in order to supplement the observations using
ﬁrms without overseas aﬃliates. The total of 140 was taken so as to make the
ratio of FDI to non-FDI ﬁrms roughly 3:1. The combined sample of 534
ﬁrms form the basis of our regression analysis, but only 451 of them contain
complete data for entry into the regression estimation. It is generally be-
lieved that Taiwanese ﬁrms underreported their actual amounts of invest-
ment in China. Our usage of output value rather than investment amount in
regression analysis avoids the underestimation problem. There may also be
ﬁrms that hide their investment altogether. Hopefully, our randomly chosen
non-FDI sample does not contain many of such ﬁrms. Both the MOEA and
the BOLA surveys covered ﬁrms of all sizes, so there is no selection bias
problem associated with size. The regression results are shown in table 4.5.
From equation (1), we can derive the eﬀects of domestic output (Y1) and
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120 Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua KuIf we ﬁt the parameter estimates into equations (2) and (3), we obtain the
estimated eﬀects of Y1 and Y2 on labor demand. The values of Y1 and Y2,
and W 1, W 2, and W 3, are taken to be the sample means. We estimate these
eﬀects for ﬁrms investing in diﬀerent locations as we did in the previous
section. The results are shown in table 4.6.
It can be seen from table 4.6 that the demand for all kinds of labor in-
creases with an increase in domestic output. For example, for those ﬁrms
investing in China only, the demand for managerial workers increases by
0.1760 for each NT$ billion (Taiwanese currency) increase in domestic
output (as Y1 is measured in NT$ billions). Since the Divisia index for la-
bor has been normalized, this ﬁgure implies that in comparison with the
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Table 4.5 Regression estimates of generalized Leontief production function
Independent variables Parameter estimates t-statistic
Dependent variable: Managerial workers (L1)
Y1 –1.639   10–2 0.299
Y2 0.391 3.110∗∗
YY –0.232 2.430∗∗
Y1W 12 9.552   10–2 1.348
Y1W 13 0.103 3.152∗∗
Y2W 12 –0.449 3.068∗∗
Y2W 13 –3.610   10–2 0.992
YYW 12 0.363 3.016∗∗
YYW 13 –5.645   10–2 1.187




Y1W 21 9.552   10–2 1.348
Y1W 23 –0.131 2.230∗∗
Y2W 21 –0.449 3.068∗∗
Y2W 23 –0.125 2.101∗∗
YYW 21 0.363 3.016∗∗
YYW 23 0.177 2.254∗∗




Y1W 31 0.103 3.408∗∗
Y1W 32 –0.131 –2.380∗∗
Y2W 31 –3.610   10–2 0.992
Y2W 32 –0.125 2.101∗∗
YYW 31 –5.645   10–2 1.187
YYW 32 0.177 2.254∗∗
Notes: System weighted R2   0.5649; degree of freedom: 1,335; YY   (Y1Y2)1/2; Y1W 12  
Y1W 1
–1/2 W2
1/2; Y1W 13   Y1W 1
–1/2; Y2W 12   Y2W1
–1/2 W2
1/2; Y2W 13   Y2W1
–1/2 W 3
1/2; YYW 12  
(Y1Y2)1/2W 1
1/2; YYW 13   (Y1Y2)1/2W 1
–1/2W 3
1/2.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.sample mean, there is an increase of 17.60 percent in managerial workers.
Similarly, for each NT$ billion increase in domestic output, the demand for
technical workers increases by 29.88 percent, and the demand for blue-
collar workers increases by 14.12 percent. The results indicate that by 1999,
the expansion in domestic production had led to an expansion in all three
kinds of labor, although technical personnel tended to beneﬁt the most,
followed by managerial staﬀ, and then blue-collar workers the least. This
pattern prevails across all investment locations, despite the fact that ﬁrm
size diﬀers signiﬁcantly across diﬀerent subgroups. This implies that the
output eﬀect on employment is mainly driven by the nature of technology
that, as Taiwanese industry intensiﬁes its technology content, tends to fa-
vor technical workers.
Table 4.7 lists the mean values of Y1 and Y2 for the diﬀerent FDI sub-
groups. It can be seen that the subgroup of ﬁrms investing in China only is
the smallest of the three groups in terms of domestic output, followed by
the subgroup investing in China plus other regions, with the subgroup in-
vesting only outside of China being the largest. However, the subgroup in-
vesting in China and other regions also has the highest overseas production
ratio, at 0.702, followed by the China only subgroup at 0.475, and then the
outside China subgroup at 0.292.
Referring back to table 4.6 also shows that overseas production has ex-
erted a uniformly negative eﬀect on each kind of labor, which suggests that
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Table 4.6 Eﬀects of domestic and overseas production on employment
Managerial Technical Blue-collar
Domestic Overseas Domestic Overseas Domestic Overseas 
production production production production production production
Investing in China 
only (136) 0.1760 –0.0291 0.2988 –0.0413 0.1412 –0.0481
Investing in China 
and others (126) 0.1847 –0.0286 0.2831 –0.0387 0.1264 –0.0220
Investing outside 
China (113) 0.1762 –0.0307 0.3018 –0.0533 0.1559 –0.0845
Notes: Domestic and overseas production is estimated in NT$ billions. Number of samples in paren-
theses.
Table 4.7 Sample means, by FDI group (NT$ million)
Domestic Overseas Overseas/Domestic  No.  of 
FDI location output output ratio samples
China only 1,795.3 851.9 0.475 136
China and others 3,995.0 2,805.8 0.702 126
Other than China 5,591.1 1,633.8 0.292 113when holding domestic output constant, domestic employment for a ﬁrm
engaging in overseas production will decline by between 2 percent and 8
percent. This implies that overseas production complements domestic
production and therefore reduces the need for labor inputs at any given
output level. However, we should not jump to the conclusion that overseas
production reduces domestic employment, because such a complementary
relationship also cuts down the cost of domestic production, thus enhanc-
ing the competitiveness of the company as a whole, which, in turn, may
lead to an expansion in domestic output. In other words, overseas produc-
tion exerts a substitution eﬀect that reduces the demand for labor at any
given domestic output as well as an output eﬀect that expands domestic
production. The net result has to take both eﬀects into account; thus, it is
the output eﬀect to which we now turn.
We take the Census of Manufacturersdata and choose the ﬁrms that have
survived throughout the period under study to explore the eﬀects of FDI
on domestic output. A simple regression is employed to estimate this eﬀect:
(4) LY 99    0    1LY 93    2DFI1    3DFI2    4DFI3    5DFI4
   6IND
where the variables are as follows:
LY 99: logarithm of domestic output in 1999
LY 93: logarithm of domestic output in 1993
DFI1: dummy variable for ﬁrms investing in China only
DFI2: dummy variable for ﬁrms investing in China and other regions
DFI3: dummy variable for ﬁrms investing only outside China
DFI4: dummy variable for ﬁrms investing in unknown regions
IND: dummy variable for high-growth industries
In equation (4), we use the output in the base year (i.e., 1993) to project
the output in the future year, 1999. Thus the coeﬃcient  1 reﬂects the av-
erage growth rate between 1993 and 1999. The dummy variables, DFI1–
DFI4, capture the extra growth attributable to overseas investments, and
the dummy variable, IND, captures the extra growth attributable to indus-
try aﬃliation. Included in the regression analysis were a total of 50,164
ﬁrms that survived the 1993–1999 period. The results are reported in table
4.8, which shows that the coeﬃcients for dummy variables, DFI1–DFI4,
were all positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that foreign in-
vestment does indeed contribute to extra growth in output after control-
ling for the industry eﬀect.
Compared to non-FDI ﬁrms, ﬁrms investing only in China recorded ex-
tra growth of 18 percent over the 1993–1999 period, those ﬁrms that in-
vested in China and other regions gained an extra 51.7 percent, and those
whose investment was only outside of China achieved 46.4 percent growth.
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expanded their domestic output.
We can therefore estimate the output eﬀect of FDI on domestic produc-
tion using these estimates; that is, our aim is to estimate the additional do-
mestic output that is attributable to FDI.
Taking the estimate of   in equation (4), this would be  Y1   Y1    /(1  
 ), where  corresponds to the location of investment. This output eﬀect is
to be added to the substitution eﬀect to come up with the net eﬀect of over-
seas production on domestic labor demand; thus, the total eﬀect of FDI on
domestic labor Li is












i   Y2,
where the ﬁrst term reﬂects the output eﬀect and the second term reﬂects
the substitution eﬀect.
Inserting the relevant parameter estimates into equation (5), using the
relations established in equation (4), we obtain the estimates at the sample
means for total employment eﬀect arising from FDI. These are shown in
table 4.9.
It can be seen from table 4.9 that the total employment eﬀects on FDI
are positive for all kinds of labor and for all investment locations, with
the exception of those investments undertaken outside of China. For the
subgroup investing only outside of China, domestic employment of blue-
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Table 4.8 Eﬀect of FDI on domestic output
Dependent variable: LY 99 Parameter estimates t-statistic
Intercept 1.217 44.562∗∗
LY 93 0.869 303.763∗∗
Investing in China only (DFI1) 0.180 5.573∗∗
Investing in China and others (DFI2) 0.517 9.288∗∗
Investing outside China (DFI3) 0.464 13.071∗∗
Unknown FDI regions (DFI4) 0.424 10.530∗∗
High-growth industry (IND) 0.198 21.388∗∗
Notes: R2   0.6818; F-statistic   17,915.45; degrees of freedom: 50,158.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4.9 Overall eﬀect of FDI on domestic employment
Managerial Technical Blue-collar 
workers workers workers
Investing in China only 0.0402 0.0717 0.0277
Investing in China and others 0.1185 0.1933 0.0755
Investing outside of China 0.0833 0.1415 –0.0237collar workers is adversely aﬀected by FDI (a decline of 2.37 percent). The
table also shows that technical workers are the biggest winners from FDI;
regardless of the investment locations, the greatest increase is in the do-
mestic employment of technical workers. We interpret this outcome as re-
ﬂecting the fact that domestic production in recent years has been restruc-
tured towards more technology-intensive methods. Managerial workers
also gain substantially from FDI but not as much as their technical coun-
terparts. Blue-collar workers gain the least, and they may occasionally
even lose. Capital outﬂow favoring technical workers was also found in
Feenstra (1996), while Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997) found that it fa-
vored managerial staﬀ. In short, FDI may well aﬀect diﬀerent labor groups
in diﬀerent ways, but the overall eﬀect is more likely to be positive than
negative. The group that is most likely to feel any negative eﬀects is the
blue-collar group of workers.
It is noticeable that ﬁrms simultaneously investing in China and other
regions create the greatest proportion of new jobs at home. We take this
subgroup of ﬁrms to be truly in pursuit of globalization, since globaliza-
tion leads to an expansion of domestic production. This also manifests
itself in the largest parameter estimate for DFI2 among all DFIs. Those
investing only in China do not create as much demand for technical and
managerial workers at home because production in China is characterized
by a low technology requirement and simple production arrangements.
Going back to table 4.3 in which domestic employment is shown to de-
cline for ﬁrms investing only in China, we may conclude that FDI, per se,
is not to blame for the plight of labor; it is instead the fact that these in-
vestors belong to low-growth (or even declining) industries, as well as be-
ing small in size, that account for their inability to maintain their employ-
ment levels at home. In addition to the industry eﬀect, the fact that the
China-only group did not generate as much output-expansion eﬀect as the
other investment groups also contributes to their below-par performance.
Although China production enhances the competitiveness of domestic
production, just like other overseas production, it also takes market op-
portunities away from Taiwan because Chinese and Taiwanese suppliers
are often viewed by foreign buyers (particularly in the Western markets) as
close substitutes.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the eﬀects of FDI on domestic employment by ex-
amining the data of Taiwan’s manufacturing industry. In terms of growth
in their number of employees, those ﬁrms investing abroad have outper-
formed those ﬁrms that have not undertaken such investment. Moreover,
ﬁrms that have invested abroad have a higher probability of survival than
the have nots; survival means maintaining some jobs at home.
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but interrelated outputs from a joint production function, we may estimate
the eﬀects of overseas production on domestic production and, thereafter,
the consequences for domestic employment. Our study of Taiwanese man-
ufacturing data indicates that overseas production reduces the demand for
labor in domestic operations at any given domestic output. This implies
that through joint production, overseas production reduces the input re-
quirements at home to yield a given domestic output. In other words, over-
seas production substitutes for primary inputs in the domestic production
process.
From a presumption of cost-minimization, this implies that overseas
production complements domestic production to reduce the overall costs
of cross-border operations, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of a
company; this is to be achieved through a division of labor between the
headquarters and the aﬃliates. Such enhanced competitiveness, in turn,
helps ﬁrms to expand their domestic output, which leads to an increase
in the demand for labor. Therefore, the total eﬀect of FDI on domestic
employment is a combination of output-expansion eﬀect and input-
substitution eﬀect. Our estimates show that, in most cases, the output-
expansion eﬀect more than oﬀsets the input-substitution eﬀect to yield a
net positive eﬀect on domestic employment; however, the magnitude of
employment eﬀect arising from FDI diﬀers across diﬀerent labor groups.
In the case of Taiwan, technical workers tend to beneﬁt most from FDI,
followed by managerial workers, with blue-collar workers beneﬁting the
least; indeed, they may even be adversely aﬀected. This implies that after
overseas investment has taken place, a reconﬁguration of the division of la-
bor within a ﬁrm will tend to shift domestic production toward technol-
ogy- and management-intensive operations.
Diﬀerent investment locations exert slightly diﬀerent impacts on do-
mestic employment mainly because of the diﬀerences in output-expansion
eﬀect. Those ﬁrms that invest only in China contribute the least to the ex-
pansion of domestic output, followed by ﬁrms that invest only outside of
China, while FDI covering both China and other regions is most con-
ducive to domestic output expansion.
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This paper is very well written and organized and presents very interesting
ﬁndings. It conducts rigorous quantitative analyses based on a couple of
large sets of microdata and investigates the relationship between outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic employment at the ﬁrm
level. The authors argue that overseas production substitutes for the do-
mestic production of primary inputs, which reduces the demand for labor
in domestic operations; on the other hand, overseas production also low-
ers the costs of cross-border operations, which enhances companies’ over-
all competitiveness and, in turn, helps them to expand domestic output.
On the whole, therefore, FDI has a net positive eﬀect on domestic employ-
ment. Because there are very few studies on this issue, particularly at such
a microlevel, for middle-developed countries like Taiwan, this is a highly
commendable paper.
The study makes an important contribution in the following respects.
First, it deals with a very interesting and important topic. The eﬀect of out-
ward FDI on domestic labor demand is an issue of major concern in many
developed countries, where people are worried about job losses as many
production processes are shifted to low-wage countries. Although a large
number of studies have been conducted for the United States and Euro-
pean countries, very few have looked at Asian countries to examine this
topic. The second contribution of this paper is that it analyzes ﬁrm-level
data. The authors use three sets of microdata—from the Manufacturing
Census, the employment survey by Taiwan’s Bureau of Labor Aﬀairs, and
the Survey on Overseas Investment by Manufacturing Firms by the Min-
istry of Economic Aﬀairs—and combine the latter two data sets for their
analysis. Third, the authors compile and analyze simple statistics and also
conduct an econometric analysis of the data based on the generalized
Leontief cost function framework. Both the simple analysis of the statistics
in itself and their econometric investigation, which makes it possible to es-
timate the various eﬀects of FDI on domestic labor demand quantitatively,
provide valuable insights. Although we should note that their econometric
analysis may include substantial errors and biases, it is certainly the last
point that is the most important contribution of this paper. I will discuss
the details of the econometric method later.
First, however, I would like to turn to speciﬁc comments. Table 4.1 shows
that almost half of Taiwan’s total outward FDI goes to China, based on
which the authors focus on China as the main destination for FDI in the
analysis that follows. In the following analyses, they divide sample ﬁrms ac-
cording to the location of their FDI into four categories: China only, China
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Keiko Ito is a lecturer of economics at Senshu University.and others, other than China, and unknown. We should note, however,
that, according to table 4.1, the United States is another large recipient of
Taiwanese FDI, also accounting for almost a half of Taiwan’s total FDI.
Taiwan’s FDI in the United States is conducted probably for the purpose
of establishing a sales base, while FDI in China is for production. This
diﬀerence may have a crucial inﬂuence on the estimated eﬀects of FDI on
the domestic demand for labor. In addition, the fact that the United States
is such a large recipient of Taiwanese FDI implies that many ﬁrms in the
“China and others” category would have undertaken investment in China
and the United States. These ﬁrms are likely to produce in China and sell
their products in the United States. The results throughout the paper might
suggest that ﬁrms with both production and sales bases overseas (i.e., FDI
covering both China and other regions) are most likely to experience an ex-
pansion of domestic output and employment.
Next, table 4.2 suggests that ﬁrms engaging in FDI have a higher sur-
vival rate than those that do not. We should point out that non-FDI ﬁrms
are much smaller than FDI ﬁrms. Because larger ﬁrms are more likely to
survive, the higher survival rate of FDI ﬁrms might be attributable to the
diﬀerence in size of non-FDI ﬁrms and FDI-ﬁrms. In addition, I am not
sure how the authors treat ﬁrms that were not undertaking FDI as of 1993
but were doing so as of 2000. These ﬁrms should have been in the “non-
FDI ﬁrms” cohort in 1993 and entered the “FDI ﬁrms” cohort in 2000. In
that case, are they treated as exited non-FDI ﬁrms and as new entrants
among FDI ﬁrms? If the authors treat these ﬁrms like this, the exit rate for
non-FDI ﬁrms may be exaggerated. It should be made clear whether non-
FDI ﬁrms may only seem to have exited business, while in fact they only
moved from one category to another.
Finally I would like to comment on the econometric analysis employed
in this study. This study estimates labor demand functions derived from the
generalized Leontief cost function, while most related previous studies em-
ploy the translog cost function approach. Probably because capital stock
data at the ﬁrm level are not available, the authors assume that the elastic-
ity of substitution between capital and composite labor is zero and there-
fore  estimate the generalized Leontief function without capital input.
However, I think that the strong assumption on the substitution between
capital and labor may induce serious errors and derive biased estimates
of cost parameters between subgroups in the labor force. According to
Hamermesh’s (1986) literature survey, previous empirical investigations
conclude that the separability of labor from capital is not supported by the
data and suggest that it is necessary to include the quantity or price of cap-
ital services. We should also note that the estimation may include further
errors or biases due to the exclusion of factor inputs for overseas produc-
tion. Given the unavailability of capital stock (or capital price) data and
overseas factor inputs (or factor price) data at the ﬁrm level, there might be
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terpreting the estimated eﬀects of domestic and overseas production on
employment. The most consistent ﬁnding in previous studies on labor de-
mand is that physical capital substitutes more easily for production work-
ers (unskilled labor) than for nonproduction workers (skilled labor;
Hamermesh 1986). Moreover, most previous studies found that the de-
mand elasticity for nonproduction workers is lower than that for produc-
tion workers (Hamermesh 1986). Given the decreasing trend in the price
of capital in Taiwan, we may infer that the demand for blue-collar workers
will decrease much more than the demand for managerial or technical
workers when the capital input data are included in the analysis. Further-
more, if the wage level of blue-collar workers in Taiwan rose above that in
China, the domestic demand for blue-collar workers among ﬁrms invest-
ing in China would be further reduced. It is certainly very diﬃcult to in-
clude the price of overseas factor inputs due to data constraints. However,
even when capital stock data are not available, it might still be possible to
calculate or estimate the price of capital at the ﬁrm level, for example, by
obtaining data on interest payments, the amount of debt, and so on, if
these are available. Alternatively, the authors could estimate the price of
capital at the industry level and use this for their cost function analysis, as-
suming that the price of capital is the same for all ﬁrms within an industry.
However, these are minor criticisms and suggestions for further expan-
sion of a study that, overall, is solid and shows very interesting results. The
authors were able to show that overseas production in most cases had a net
positive eﬀect on domestic labor demand and that technical workers were
the biggest winners from FDI, while blue-collar workers gained the least.
This implies that domestic production in Taiwan is tending to shift toward
technology- and management-intensive operations. The observation that
the shift in skilled-labor occurs in a middle-developed country like Taiwan
will attract a lot of attention. However, we should be aware of possible er-
rors or biases as a result of the exclusion of capital and overseas factor in-
puts, and I hope that the authors will get a chance to include these factor
inputs in future studies.
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The paper by Tain-Jy Chen and Ying-Hua Ku raises an interesting empir-
ical question that does not have an unambiguous theoretical answer. Does
foreign direct investment (FDI) made by the home country cause job losses
at home? Theoretically, there are two opposite forces at work. Overseas
production substitutes exports. Reduction in exports lowers employment
at home. On the other hand, a ﬁrm that makes overseas investment tends
to be better able to use resources eﬃciently. This helps the ﬁrm to survive
the competition at home and enables it to continue to hire workers. If the
eﬃciency gain is big enough, the ﬁrm may even expand itself and increase
employment.
The question of which force is stronger has important policy implica-
tions. Labor unions may believe that FDI hurts workers at home, and
therefore they lobby against it. This question is also more general than it
appears to be. Analytically it is similar to another policy question. Coun-
tries that contemplate importing labor from outside may face the same op-
position. A ﬁrm using its money to hire imported workers in the home
country is in a similar situation compared to another that sends money to
other countries in the form of FDI. Importing labor also has two opposite
eﬀects. First, some local workers are displaced. Second, importing cheaper
or more-eﬃcient workers makes the ﬁrm more competitive at home. The
chance for its migration to other countries decreases. Thus, there is also a
job creation eﬀect. The answer to whether labor should be imported is
again an empirical issue.
The paper has set an example for policy research that is based on solid
empirical ﬁndings and rigorous methodology. It assumes that the produc-
tion function is generalized Leontief. By making use of the Shephard’s
lemma and estimating the cost function, the paper shows that a ﬁrm’s em-
ployment of diﬀerent types of workers is a function of their respective wage
rates, its output at home and at the foreign country. It is found that an in-
crease in the ﬁrm’s output at the foreign country reduces employment of all
types of workers at home, provided that output at home is held constant. It
is also shown that overseas investment raises output at home, which in turn
increases employment. According to the paper’s estimates, the net eﬀect of
overseas investment on home employment is positive. The methodology is
nicely developed, and the results are reasonable.
If overseas investment actually raises home employment, why do labor
unions object to it? A plausible answer is that competition from abroad
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opment at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.could lower the wage rates of workers at home. It would be useful if the au-
thors could estimate the eﬀect on wage rates.
The paper documents that there has been substantial restructuring of
the Taiwanese economy during the sample period. From 1991 to 2000, the
electronics industry has employed 145,748 more people, but the apparel in-
dustry has lost 54,104 jobs. Moreover, manufacturing has 400,000 fewer
jobs, but the service sector has gained 1.4 million jobs in the period from
1987 to 1994. When economic restructuring takes place, the unemploy-
ment rate usually rises because people leaving an industry need time to
generate oﬀers from other industries. One would suspect that economic re-
structuring should be one of the factors that aﬀect unemployment during
the sample period. In a study on the eﬀect of imported workers on em-
ployment in Hong Kong, we have found that it is essential to include re-
structuring as a control variable (Kwan, Lian, and Lui 1995). The latter can
conveniently be measured by an index proposed by Lilien (1982), which
tells us how extensive are the movements of workers from one sector to
another. Our results indicate that economic restructuring signiﬁcantly
changes the unemployment rate, but the number of imported workers has
little or no eﬀect at all. To reduce the possibility of speciﬁcation bias due
to the omission of an important variable, the authors may want to address
this issue in their future research.
Because globalization and fragmentation will likely continue, overseas
investment will grow. The ﬁndings of this paper will become more and
more relevant and important in the future.
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